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Abstract: The assumption that voters systematically defend the welfare state is challenged by recent
research showing that parties are on average not punished and sometimes even rewarded for welfare
state retrenchment. We work to understand better the micro-foundations for this finding of
non-punishment by exploring individuals’ preferences over social policy. In particular, we distinguish
general support for redistribution from views that existing levels of government spending strain the
economy. As voters value economic stability in addition to equality, they are hypothesized to tolerate
or support retrenchment when they feel that there are economic costs at stake. Analyzing a sample
of 13 European societies with data from the European Social Survey Round 4, our results show that
only welfare state supporters who do not believe that the welfare state hampers the economy punish
retrenching governments. This finding helps explain the lack of more widespread electoral punishment
following retrenchment, though other results also suggest that retrenchment involves a rather
delicate process of juggling the preferences of diverse constituencies.
Introduction
In many countries, parties rolling back social policies
have not suffered electoral punishment (Kumlin, 2007a;
Armingeon and Giger, 2008; Giger, 2011; Giger and
Nelson, 2011), despite strong public support for the
welfare state (Gelissen, 2000; Blekesaune, 2007; Jæger,
2009). To explain the lack of electoral punishment,
scholars typically draw on the literature on blame
avoidance strategies (Weaver, 1986; Pierson, 2001;
Hering, 2008) with the implicit assumption that the
only way to retrench without losing votes is to hide it.
We forward a new argument to explain the non-
punishment finding. In particular, we argue that the
perceived economic costs of a large welfare state by some
voters counteract their high levels of general support,
thereby making them susceptible to tolerating a
retrenchment agenda.
Our analysis provides micro-foundations for a
common justification of welfare state retrenchment, the
state of the economy. As feedback mechanisms legitimate
policies over time, politicians in generous welfare states
are supposedly constrained in their ability to attack
social policies directly. Yet, we believe that, even when
blame avoidance strategies are in play, politicians are
often hard pressed to articulate carefully and openly why
reforms to popular programs are necessary, and that the
widespread use of these justification mechanisms largely
explains the absence of widespread punishment. For this
reason, although the blame avoidance literature depicts
politicians as master magicians, drawing eyes away from
the truth, we take a slightly different view by arguing
that retrenchment can be seen from two angles—
rescinding on commitments to social justice or restoring
economic competitiveness—and that politicians will
intentionally focus attention to the latter because the
view that cutbacks help the economy are widespread and
people care about the economy.
As this line of argumentation suggests, we have to
disentangle general beliefs about the welfare state
from attitudes regarding its perceived costs. Data show
that, while general support for redistribution remains
strong, large shares of pro-welfare voters also believe
that generous social policies hamper economic
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competitiveness. Further analysis demonstrates that
parties’ constituencies vary systematically in their beliefs
over the welfare state and its economic costs, and our
results show that only welfare state supporters who do
not believe that the welfare state hampers the economy
punish retrenching governments. The implications of
this finding for the politics and electoral consequences of
welfare state retrenchment are explored.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section
outlines the theoretical framework and explores the
apparent contradiction that arises from high general
support for the welfare state and the absence of electoral
costs for retrenching governments. Second, partisan
hypotheses are derived for retrenchment activity and
electoral punishment. After reviewing the methodology,
these hypotheses are then tested and the results dis-
cussed. The final section concludes.
Distinguishing Two Dimensions
of Welfare State Preferences:
General Support for Social Policy
and the Perceived Costs of Social
Policy
Belief systems in general and attitudes toward the welfare
state in particular are known to be complex and
comprise more than a single dimension (Converse,
1964; Zaller, 1992). Even for the subfield of welfare
state attitudes, one can separate several layers, objectives,
and aspects [for a summary see Kumlin (2007b)].
Further, socio-psychological work teaches us that not
all attitudes have the same relevance for political
behavior, as certain aspects of our belief systems are
more easily accessible than others (Fazio, 1986; Bartels,
2008), and citizens can hold seemingly conflicted or
ambiguous attitudes toward certain political topics
(Kinder, 1994; Krosnick, 1990). In this way, assuming
unyielding political support for all components of the
welfare state from evidence of high general support for
the idea of redistribution seems hasty and potentially
erroneous.1 Hence, we propose to consider the inter-
connectivity between general support and views regard-
ing the economic costs of social spending to derive a
more nuanced picture of how citizens value the welfare
state and where they potentially disagree with the current
government policies [for a similar argument about the
need for more disaggregation see Jakobsen (2010)].
Despite these insights into the complex nature of
public opinion, the mainstream welfare state literature
tends to focus almost exclusively on generalized support
for the welfare state in examining the role of public
opinion on welfare state reform. Studies based on such
survey data convincingly demonstrate that a majority
of individuals support the principle of redistribution
(Gelissen, 2000; Blekesaune, 2007; Jæger, 2009).2 In this
way, on a general level of social policy attitudes, we
indeed find overwhelming support for the welfare state.
Yet, analyses of welfare state reform often proceed on the
assumption that only generalized support for the welfare
state matters to voters and, by extension, the role of
voters in structuring retrenchment activity and subse-
quent electoral fallout.
Without contesting the finding of high generalized
support, we aim to incorporate the insights about the
complexity of belief systems more firmly into the
literature on welfare state reform. While the range of
additional dimensions to belief systems is likely large,
we focus in the remainder of this study on the role of
beliefs about the economic costs of the welfare state.
There are many reasons to expect that the state of
the economy influences social policy preferences and
therefore politics of welfare reform. As case in point,
despite high levels of support for the welfare state per se,
there is also evidence that citizens value not only social
policies but also a sound fiscal policy and a thriving
economy (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Boeri,
Bo¨rsch-Supan and Tabellini, 2001). Governments are
also judged heavily on the state of the economy (Kiewiet,
1984; Lewis-Beck, 1986, 1988; Powell and Whitten,
1993), which makes politicians attune to voters’
perceptions of government performance on economic
matters.
Demand for a strong economy should also hold
implications for how voters evaluate the economic
sustainability of the welfare state. The welfare state is
often attacked for weakening the economy (Larsen and
Andersen, 2009), and this view has gained momentum in
recent decades because of the rise of the Neoliberal
orthodoxy. Although heightened competition, a tighter
macroeconomic environment, and demographic change
certainly challenge the sustainability of traditional wel-
fare state arrangements, neo-liberal rhetoric often claims
that all types of government spending impede economic
competitiveness, even as research shows that some social
policies are actually supportive of the economy (Bradley
and Stephens, 2007). Additionally, while right-leaning
parties have long used neo-liberal and other ideas to
argue that social spending threatens economic competi-
tiveness, governments of all shades have leaned on the
argument of economic hardship in justifying more
stringent social agendas.
Drawing on the aforementioned discussion, individ-
uals may be thought to hold at least two dimensions of
attitudes toward the welfare state: general preferences
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over their preferred level of social justice and views on
the extent to which budgetary commitments to the
welfare state hold negative economic ramifications. To
some extent, one might expect strong affinities between
these two dimensions. As individuals seek to reduce
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), they likely modify
their views on social justice to accommodate beliefs
about the economy.
At the same time, completely eliminating cognitive
dissonance from one’s belief system is unlikely because
the world is complex, and views toward its appropriate
structure are contingent on a host of factors. As a result,
an individual may hold preferences toward the welfare
state, which appear at first sight internally inconsistent,
in the sense that the achievement of one goal impedes
the realization of another but which, in fact, reflects a
nuanced view of a highly complex and interrelated
world. For instance, an individual can support the
general picture of social assistance to the needy and at
the same time agree to tighter eligibility rules for social
assistance to avoid abuse or productivity losses due to
reduction in labor supply. In this way, divergent answers
do not necessarily indicate ambivalence but merely
reflect different types of welfare attitudes and the
interconnectivity of attitudes. In conclusion, we posit
that all combinations of the two dimensions mentioned
previously are theoretically reasonable and empirically
observable. For example, we anticipate people who
believe in social justice and do not see economic
trade-offs in enacting related policies, as well as citizens
who support the general principle of social redistribution
but question the economic sustainability of the welfare
state. To analyze the mutual importance of general
beliefs over redistribution and beliefs about the eco-
nomic costs to social spending, we derive four descrip-
tive groups, which are expressed below in Table 1.
The first row contains those who believe that the
welfare state incurs economic costs. Individuals who
believe that social spending hampers the economy but
nevertheless want to redistribute income are labeled
‘conditional believers’ because they favor redistribution,
which they nevertheless see as harmful to the economy.
Those who believe cuts would help but do not want to
redistribute are labeled ‘economic opposers’, as their
views align closely with the perspective that market
mechanisms alone are preferable.
Turning to the groups that disagree with the idea that
the welfare state is economically unsustainable, we find
two divergent groups. We label the first group ‘uncon-
ditional believers’ because they want a welfare state and
are not persuaded that this goal carries economic
burdens. Finally, we label those against the welfare
state but not because of its economic costliness ‘uncon-
ditional opposers’, as their preference for low govern-
ment spending does not follow an economic imperative
and is therefore of a more fundamental nature.
Mapping social policy attitudes on these two dimen-
sions provides leverage in grasping how parties are able
to retrench despite high popular support for redistribu-
tion. People in our category ‘conditional believers’, for
example, are exactly those citizens ‘wrongly’ classified by
the current literature. If we only considered general
welfare state beliefs, we would see them all as fully
supportive of the welfare state and hence willing to
punish retrenching governments. Broadening our per-
spective to take a more encompassing view of welfare
state attitudes, however, reveals that these people share
concerns about the costs of social policy, which arguably
temper their proclivity toward electoral punishment,
particularly if the governing parties manage to justify
retrenchment convincingly with arguments about its
economic pay-offs. In this way, holding a pro-market
stance does not preclude support for the general
principle of social equality, although these general beliefs
are probably less relevant for their voting behavior.3
Therefore, while social policy researchers tend to focus
exclusively on the high levels of general support, the
assumption that this support translates into cutbacks
being unpopular and therefore electoral backlash is too
hasty. In the space that follows, we explore more in
depth the link between general beliefs over redistribu-
tion and the perceived costs to social spending to
understand how appeals to the economic costs of the
welfare state may facilitate retrenchment for different
party families.
Table 1 Preferences over the welfare state: general beliefs versus economic costs
General welfare state support
High Low
Perceived costs of welfare state
High Conditional believers Economic opposers
Low Unconditional believers Unconditional opposers
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Puzzles for Welfare State
Research: Implications of Complex
Belief Systems for Theories of
Retrenchment and Electoral
Punishment
Allowing for multiple belief dimensions opens up the
possibility that the group of inconsolable punishers is
smaller than previously expected. Only some welfare
state supporters, our subset of ‘unconditional believers’,
are disinclined to accept arguments that retrenchment is
necessary to sustain economic competitiveness over the
long term. Of course, if individuals indeed seek high
levels of cognitive consistency, the group of ‘conditional
believers’, i.e. welfare state supporters who nevertheless
believe there to be economic costs to social spending,
will be small. On the other hand, if this group is not
small, we posit that this holds major implications for our
understanding of both government retrenchment activity
and the electoral costs of retrenchment. Let us now
elaborate on our expectations in more detail.
As it stands, the finding of high general support for
the welfare state leads to the common inference that all
mainstream parties rely on ‘anti-cutback’ constituencies.
Drawing on the framework in Table 1, we challenge this
conclusion and contend that the crucial question is
rather whether all party electorates reveal the same share
of ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ believers, respect-
ively, with the intuition that only the latter are clearly
anti-retrenchment. The historic commitment of left
(Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983) and religious parties
(Huber, Ragin and Stephens, 1995; van Kersbergen,
1995; van Kersbergen and Hemerijck, 2004) to the
welfare state should help them garner support among
unconditional believers. Moreover, as the literature has
shown that right parties retrench more often than left
parties (Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and Scruggs,
2004), we find good reason to expect that parties’
constituencies continue to vary systematically today.
Specifically, we hypothesize that clearly left-leaning
parties (left socialist and socialist) have the highest
proportion of unconditional believers, followed by
religious, and then more right-leaning parties, including
conservative and liberal parties (which we do not
distinguish from each other). In addition, we hypothe-
size the reverse ordering for the proportion of voters
falling into the conditional and unconditional opposers
category, respectively.4
Our theoretical framework renders possible one more
group, that of conditional believers: those that want the
welfare state but agree that cutting it back would
improve the economy. To understand the broader
implications of conditional believers, more information
about the hierarchy of these attitudes would be neces-
sary: do positions over general support override those
about the economic costs or vice versa? Do preferences
apply to particular policy domains or groups of
individuals?
Given the multitude of reasons why individuals may
hold conflicted preferences, we hypothesize that all
parties have relatively high shares of such voters but
for different reasons. For instance, people with a leftist
ideology should find it hard to deny the general principle
of social justice even though some of them might buy
into neo-liberal arguments about the costliness of
government spending. However, they should only ex-
press their concerns on the more concrete aspects of
welfare state attitudes such as questions related to
economic feasibility of high standards of welfare state
generosity. A different reasoning is expected for people
with a more right-wing ideology. While most of them
should agree without hesitation that less state spending is
good for the economy, they might be inclined to support
the general principle of welfare spending because the
welfare state has become the status quo.
Empirical support for our hypotheses speaks to
parties’ incentives to propose a retrenchment agenda,
and these issues are taken up further in the ‘Results’
section. Another straightforward implication of our
framework, however, involves expectations regarding
the electoral backlash associated with retrenchment.
Again building on Table 1, we theorize that only
‘unconditional believers’ systematically withdraw support
for retrenching governments. Helping the economy is
not an excuse to do away with the welfare state
according to these voters, which makes them unforgiving
of parties that roll back social benefits.
While also supportive of the welfare state, conditional
believers are, on the other hand, susceptible to lines of
argumentation that retrenchment improves the state of
the economy. If parties fail to justify retrenchment, these
voters may indeed punish them by voting for another
party. However, we expect this to be the exception rather
than the rule. Parties are incredibly strategic actors and
can be expected to highlight the economic repercussions
of reforms or focus electoral campaigns on the economy
if doing so holds the potential to win over reluctant
voters. As such, we expect there to be no systematic
punishment by conditional believers as a result.
Economic and unconditional opposers are not expected
to punish and may even reward retrenching
governments.
To conclude, our argument nuances the widespread
assumption that those who support the welfare state on a
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general level (i.e. both conditional and unconditional
believers) punish retrenching governments. In doing so,
affirmative results hold the potential to explain the lack
of large-scale electoral punishment.
Data and Method
The data come from the European Social Survey’s
Round 4 (2008). Specifically, we used the following
two questions to set up our analysis. First, the general
welfare state beliefs question has the following form: the
government should take measures to reduce differences in
income levels; the five answer categories range from
‘disagree strongly’ to ‘agree strongly’. We believe that
this question taps into a general dimension of welfare
state attitudes and has also often been used to oper-
ationalize welfare state beliefs.
Second, to operationalize the dimension of perceived
costs of social security, we use the following statement:
social benefits/services place too great strains on the
economy. The five response categories again run from
‘disagree strongly’ to ‘agree strongly’. The question we
use is phrased in a broad way. We interpret individuals’
response to this question as a reflection of their own
individual position, as well as their views of the rest of
the society. The way in which individuals weigh their
own and the common good depends on the individual.
These two questions are used to construct the groups
indicated in Table 1. In particular, we combined the
categories ‘agree strongly’ and ‘agree’, as well as ‘disagree
strongly’ and ‘disagree’, of each the question.5 Both
questions include a neutral category, a group that does
not lend itself to classification in any one of our four
groups.
In a first step, for the empirical analyses of the
implications of our framework, the group variables from
Table 1 become the focus of analysis. Focal independent
variables are the identifiers for the party families. We
distinguish between left socialist parties, socialist, and
religious parties on the left side of the spectrum and
conservative and liberal parties on the right. The
categorization follows Armingeon et al. (2008).
In a second step, vote for an incumbent party during
the last election serves as the dependent variable, with
the group variables from Table 1 being the independent
variables.6 Further, we control for a number of factors
known to influence the vote choice in favor of an
incumbent party, such as the perception of the state of
the economy, age, and gender (Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier, 2007; Giger, 2011). At the macro level, we
include a control for the ideological leaning of the
government, as left-wing governments could be differ-
ently punished than right-wing governments (Giger and
Nelson, 2011). This variable captures the share of left
parties in the cabinet and is taken from Armingeon et al.
(2008).
Our models include an identifier for the presence of
cutbacks coded by the authors. The data about welfare
state reforms come from the ISSA Database on interna-
tional social security.7 According to the theoretical
interest of this study, only major reforms that had a
clear focus on benefit reduction have been classified as
cutbacks. Further, only reforms in the key schemes of
social security (unemployment, health, and pensions) are
taken into account.
We reduce the sample to western European, which has
industrialized countries with a developed system of social
security, as only with this sample the social and
economic background is sufficiently similar. In detail,
we include the following countries in our analyses:
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Multilevel regressions are the methods of choice to
take the clustering of the data by countries into account.
This strategy also bears the advantage that the context
variance component captures between-country or
between-regime differences in the size of our four
groups, and we do not need to control specifically for
such contextual factors anymore, an endeavor problem-
atic anyway because of the limited amount of country
contexts (13). Our binary dependent variables ask for a
specific link function (Long, 1997).
Empirical Findings
Two dimensions of welfare state preferences
To begin, we show responses to the two main questions
under inspection to assess the degree of cognitive
consistency. If asked about the general principle that
the government should reduce the income differences
between rich and poor, a large majority supports this
claim (see Figure 1). Also, when assessing support by
party families, we do not find huge differences. While
liberal and conservative party constituencies are slightly
less likely to agree with the question (57.8 and 51.8
compared with an average of 73.7%),8 the picture of a
high general support portrayed in the literature is
confirmed here.
However, we believe that this graph is not showing the
whole picture, as it only looks at a general level of
welfare state attitudes. Our earlier discussion proposed
another dimension, which considers the perceived costs
of the welfare state. To this end, we draw on a question
about the economic trade-offs to a large welfare state.
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Figure 2 plots the answers to the question whether social
benefits and services place too heavy constraints on the
economy.
In Figure 2, it becomes visible that concerns about
the economic costs of social security are widespread.
On average, 38% believe such costs exist with only
35% denying the existence of a trade-off between
economic performance and high standards of social
welfare. While partisan differences are apparent, a large
number of supporters from each party family think that
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Figure 2 Answers to the economic costs question: whether cuts in government spending are a good thing for the economy.
Source: ESS 2008 (1—agree strongly, 5—disagree strongly).
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Figure 1 Support for the general principle of redistribution. Source: ESS 2008 (1—agree strongly, 5—disagree strongly).
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social benefits place heavy constraints on the economy;
among pro-welfare parties, 19.5% of left socialist, 32.3%
of socialist, and 41.9% of religious supporters at least
agree, whereas, on the other side of the spectrum, 45.5%
of conservative and 41.4% of liberal supporters do so.
Considering Figures 1 and 2 together, it becomes
obvious that there must be a substantive portion of
people with apparently inconsistent preferences insofar
as they agree with the general principle of the welfare
state as well as the idea that the welfare state places
excessive strain on the economy. To gain leverage on the
size and political representation of this group, we
calculate the size of the four groups identified in
Table 1 and examine how parties differ in their reliance
on each one. Table 2 gives a first impression of the size
of these groups overall (see the last row) and by party
family.
Implications for partisan strategies to
retrench
Starting with the last row of Table 2, we see that the
largest category after ‘Other’ in our schema includes
people with cognitive inconsistencies, i.e. conditional
believers. Approximately 26% of all citizens line up in
this category. The impressively high numbers of people
in this category make it clear that we cannot just qualify
them as a small minority who did not understand the
survey correctly. We believe that this pattern is therefore
better interpreted as showing a substantively interesting
pattern, which is consistent with research on political
attitudes: citizens agree with the general principle of
reducing income differences but are clearly of the
opinion that the welfare state impedes economic com-
petitiveness. A result of our schema is that the group of
unwavering welfare state supporters, unconditional be-
lievers, no longer constitutes a clear majority of the
electorate. On average, we find 24.8% of the sample in
this category. Even fewer people are unconditional
opposers who are against the (welfare) state but not
apparently because they perceive it to incur high costs
(6.4%). The group of economic opposers (4.9%), people
whose lack of support for the welfare state can be linked
to the belief that social spending hurts the economy, is
also small.
Turning to the more detailed results, left socialist,
socialist, and religious parties can be seen to draw, in
that order, more unconditional believers than more
right-leaning parties. In accordance with our expect-
ations, all party constituencies have rather large shares of
conditional believers. The highest share of economic
opposers is found in the conservative party family (8%),
as expected, although the remaining parties do not lag
far behind. The group of unconditional opposers is also
highest among conservative parties (13.6%), followed by
the liberals, and then religious and other left parties.9
Based on these results, we can begin to consider how
parties’ constituencies shape the viability of a retrench-
ment agenda. First, we posit that parties relying on many
unconditional believers do not consider a retrenchment
platform. Admittedly, we have not considered the full
range of alternative dimensions to voters’ belief systems;
as beliefs about the economic costliness of social policy
temper general support, there may be other factors that
do so as well. Nevertheless, the economic sustainability
frame is dominant, and we therefore proceed on the
assumption that voters who disagree that there are
economic costs to high social spending hold unsupport-
ive views of retrenching governments. Left socialist and
socialist parties should be particularly opposed to
retrenchment given the size of this group within their
constituencies. Our schema therefore suggests a
vote-seeking explanation for why left-leaning parties
retrench less: left-leaning parties refrain because their
supporters cannot be won over by savvy political
argumentation. At the same time, the finding that all
Table 2 Distribution of constituencies’ preferences
Party Families Unconditional
believers
Conditional
believers
Economic
opposers
Unconditional
opposers
Other
Left socialist 46.0 18.2 3.0 2.1 30.7
Socialist 32.5 25.5 4.7 3.7 33.6
Religious 23.7 22.6 5.5 6.9 41.3
Conservative 14.1 21.3 8.0 13.6 42.9
Liberal 19.9 27.8 7.6 9.2 35.5
Overall 24.8 26.0 4.9 6.4 35.2
Number of observations 6,218 6,517 1,293 1,695 9,311
Note: Entries are percentages, the row ‘Total’ reports averages weighted by countries.
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parties draw on unconditional believers to some extent
explains why parties of diverse ideological leanings avoid
attacking social justice directly. Any party clearly
prioritizing the economy over goals of social justice
opens itself up to criticism by the opposition or the
media.
The particular make up of a political party’s constitu-
ency in terms of these four groups also provides
information on the diversity of interests, which parties
must consider when drawing up reform proposals. Our
finding of highly diverse party constituencies potentially
goes some way in explaining the status quo bias of
current welfare state politics. If a party has for instance
both high shares of unconditional believers and eco-
nomic opposers, it faces the challenge of proposing
policy reforms that can, on the face of things, only
disappoint part of their constituency. Such parties may
enact blame avoidance strategies more often. At the
same, managing diversity through blame avoidance may
be a self-defeating strategy over the long run if it blurs
party identity and issue ownership. As such, parties may
consciously accept defection from unconditional be-
lievers if doing so allows them to take stronger positions
on issues of economic competitiveness and thereby
appeal to more centrist voters and parties [for a related
argument see Schumacher (2012)].
The fact that large shares of the population at least
partially buy into arguments that there are economic
costs to the welfare state also provides micro-
foundations for why justifying cutbacks by appealing to
economic arguments occurs so often [see Green-
Pedersen (2002)]. If parties are successful in making
economic concerns salient, these likely override general
welfare state beliefs. More broadly, our findings highlight
the importance of framing in social policy reforms [see
Slothuus (2007)].
Implications for electoral punishment
Our argument also has potentially important implica-
tions for our understanding of the electoral costs
associated with social policy cutbacks. While the current
literature proceeds rather quickly from notions of high
support for the welfare state to expectations about
electoral consequences, our framework allows us to
formulate more nuanced expectations about possible
effects of cutbacks for incumbent popularity. Specifically,
we expect only one group to be unforgiving of social
policy cutbacks, unconditional believers. While support-
ive of the welfare state on a general level, conditional
believers nevertheless perceive economic liabilities to a
large welfare state and are less likely to punish incum-
bents for retrenchment in social policy as a result. The
empirical evidence provided in Table 2 provides a first
snapshot in favor of our expectation: only about half of
welfare state believers do not consider there to be
economic costs and are thus expected to dislike
retrenchment per se. In a more thorough test of the
implications of our framework, we assess the support for
retrenching governments of each group identified in
Table 1.
Table 3 provides the corresponding results. Model 1
reports the results for the full sample, i.e. all our 13
countries. While unconditional believers are not gener-
ally less supportive of the incumbents, we find that the
variance in the strength of the effect is large, visible in
the large random component for the identifier for
unconditional believers. In other words, there are
instances where unconditional believers are systematic-
ally voting less for incumbents, whereas in other
instances, there is no discernible difference between
conditional and unconditional believers. This finding is
in accordance with our expectation that a difference
between the two groups should only be present after a
government retrenched the welfare state. Therefore, in a
second step, we split the sample and look separately at
countries where cutbacks took place during the last term
of the incumbents versus countries without significant
cutbacks (Models 2 and 3, respectively). We find that
unconditional believers are systematically more likely to
vote against incumbent governments when they re-
trenched but not when they did not do so. These
findings indicate on the one hand that indeed incum-
bents can suffer from retrenching social policy but are
also in accordance with recent literature, which shows
that the effects are not as widespread and not as harmful
as previously expected (Armingeon and Giger, 2008;
Giger, 2011; Giger and Nelson, 2011). In sum, the
finding that many welfare state believers do not system-
atically punish the government for retrenchment is an
important step forward into understanding the dynamics
of retrenchment activities.
To conclude, this study shows that the picture of
overwhelming popular support for the welfare state is
misleading, as citizens have complex attitudes toward the
welfare state, and only a minority supports redistribution
unconditionally. In particular, we draw attention to
concerns about the state of the economy as signifying a
dimension of belief systems, which potentially overrides
general beliefs about social justice.
Conclusions
Recent studies problematize the assumption that voters
always punish retrenching parties by showing that, on
the aggregate, some parties gain votes or ‘claim credit’
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for retrenching (Giger and Nelson, 2011), and most
parties do not lose votes at all. Although one could
interpret these results as showing that parties are skillful
masters of blame avoidance, we believe that another side
to this story exists, namely, that voters do not censure
governments for welfare state rollbacks as strongly as
previously thought. To summarize the main thrust of
our analysis, we have argued that the perceived economic
strain of social spending tempers generalized support for
redistribution and makes many voters relatively more
tolerant of a retrenchment agenda.
In our framework, individuals hold both general views
toward redistribution and at least somewhat orthogonal
views about the strain of the welfare state on the
economy. Indeed, our results show that, although a vast
majority of those sampled generally agree that a more
equal society is a normative priority, many reveal
concerns that there are economic costs at stake. All
parties draw heavily from this group of voters. The fact
that many people perceive trade-offs to high government
spending suggests that how the government pursues
certain goals is of critical importance. More than the
smoke and mirrors assumed in the blame avoidance
literature, our results suggest that governments use an
economic frame to justify retrenchment and avoid losing
votes.
We would like to end with a few caveats and
suggestions for future research. First, future research
could consider additional frames governments use to
build legitimacy for their preferred reforms. Also, so far,
our framework allows us to distinguish between two
dimensions of welfare state attitudes. Arguably, this still
might not do justice to the complexity of welfare beliefs,
as attitudes toward social welfare are even more multi-
faceted than what has been assumed here. For example,
our questions about redistribution might only be
partially capturing general beliefs about social welfare,
and other concerns such as the security dimension of
social welfare [see Petersen, (1995)] remain untouched.
Our analysis also suggests that the blame avoidance
literature does not give due attention to perceptions
about the economic sustainability of the welfare state.
The link between government spending and poor
economic performance is in no way straightforward,
and we are not presuming that there is a necessary link.
However, the rise of the neo-liberal orthodoxy and weak
economic performance in the context of strong welfare
states arguably holds implications for public opinion.
The environment of permanent fiscal austerity and
severe economic conditions together with the demo-
graphic challenges might make people more responsive
to claims of endangered economic sustainability of the
current system of social welfare. At the same time, just as
generalized support for the welfare state does not lead to
unconditional defense of existing policies, a more austere
economic climate does not automatically translate into
Table 3 Logistic multilevel regressions
Dependent variable:
incumbent vote
Model 1
Full sample
Model 2
Countries with cutback
Model 3
Countries without cutback
Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
Fixed effects
Constant 0.68 0.28*** 0.98 0.32*** 0.65 0.22***
Unconditional believers 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.07*** 0.08 0.08
Conditional believers (reference category)
Economic opposers 0.16 0.07** 0.09 0.10 0.19 0.11*
Unconditional opposers 0.13 0.08 0.28 0.11** 0.15 0.13
Others 0.10 0.05** 0.01 0.06 0.22 0.07***
Age 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
Gender 0.08 0.04** 0.10 0.05** 0.06 0.05
Perceived economic conditions 0.07 0.01*** 0.07 0.01*** 0.07 0.01***
Left-wing government 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Random effects
Individual level variance 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Context level variance 0.30 0.12 0.41 0.21 0.05 0.04
Unconditional believers variance 0.62 0.26
Covariance 0.00 0.18
Number of cases (countries) 13,482 (13) 7,941 (8) 5,540 (5)
Log likelihood 8,751.1 5,132.2 3,738.6
Note: *P < 0.1, **P< 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
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beliefs that all forms of social spending are inefficient
and need to be cut back. Particularly, during this
economic crisis as many European governments attempt
to convince their voters that painful reforms are
necessary, we are reminded that public opinion remains
highly contextualized. Actually, a weak economic context
boosts general support for redistribution (Blekesaune
2007), underscoring again ambiguities in our under-
standing about how general beliefs and those over the
economic costs to the welfare state are reconciled. In this
way, while our results uphold the expectation that the
economic frame is a viable strategy for convincing
conditional believers to tolerate a retrenchment agenda
on average, further research is necessary to understand
when parties adopt such a frame and the consequences
of doing so.
Notes
1 This critique becomes particularly relevant when
predictions such as high electoral risks are derived
from these survey data.
2 This question taps more into redistribution under-
stood as an exchange from the rich to the poor
(social justice) rather than over the life cycle (which
would suggest an insurance function) (Barr, 2001).
However, as there is sufficient overlap in both
functions of social policy, we believe that we are
sufficiently capturing general support across diverse
welfare states.
3 Giger (2011) provides more information under
which circumstances welfare state attitudes are
better or worse predictors of electoral behavior.
Kumlin (2007b) and the literature on political
attitudes in general show that general beliefs have
least relevance for actual behavior, whereas more
concrete policy-related attitudes have a higher
chance to translate into behavior.
4 The conditionality of opposers’ anti-welfare stance is
not expected to depend on partisan ideology and
therefore not considered further within this article.
5 Both questions have a neutral category (‘neither
agree nor disagree’), which has been coded into the
category ‘other’.
6 The Netherlands constitutes a special case in this
respect as a caretaker cabinet (Balkenende III, CDA,
and VVD) faced election in 2006, which was only in
power for 135 days before election day. Given the
large overlap of parties in power compared with
Balkenende II (CDA, VVD, and D66), we coded the
Balkenende II cabinet as in power from 27 May
2003 onward.
7 This database offers summaries of important re-
forms in social protection and covers all countries in
the sample of the study (www.issa.int). Additionally,
we cross-checked our coding against two recent
publications (Palier, 2010; Clasen and Clegg, 2011).
8 Results not shown here but available from the
authors on request.
9 In several countries, there are N<30 respondents in
this particular group.
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